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Abstract 
 
From a sociological perspective, ‘flexicurity’ poses important problems of defini-
tion. We will test whether, if taken in sufficiently broad terms, ‘flexicurity’ is sus-
ceptible to provide a broad ‘portmanteau’ or macro-concept collecting present re-
form strategies or present designs for reforms in many countries. This has however 
a cost: it dispenses with much of the specific substance identified in the institu-
tional arrangements of the two original ‘flexicurity’ countries, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. This all-encompassing capacity of the word was illustrated in 2005-
2006, when the notion was gradually integrated into the employment part of the 
‘Lisbon strategy’. All said and told, the question remains whether ‘flexicurity’, as a 
macro-concept, is worth what can be seen as a considerable loss of substance. Can 
the notion escape the fate of other trendy catchwords?  
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Introduction1
 
Basic principles of social science research teach that normative and positive (ana-
lytical) approaches to socially constructed objects should be separated as much as 
possible. Implementing this methodological and ethical principle is however often a 
very difficult task in the circumstances of international research situations (Barbier 
2005a). There are two main aspects to the problem: the first lies in the fact that, in 
international situations, social science researchers are confronted with the constant 
creation of new concepts/ notions2 that they cannot ignore and have to use in inter-
disciplinary circumstances; the second aspect of the difficulty lies in the reality that 
much of this international research is funded by international organisations that are 
expecting what they call ‘policy lessons’, i.e. normative prescriptions. 
In the case of ‘flexicurity’ as with other notions, like ‘activation’ for instance (Bar-
bier 2002; 2004), sociologists of social protection systems have to be especially 
rigorous in distinguishing conceptual analyses from political discourses, particu-
larly when they act as ‘experts’ and when they are, sometimes ‘naturally’ led to be 
full participants in some political or policy process. Our objective in this chapter is 
to try and disentangle some pitfalls and contribute to bringing as much clarity as we 
can to the delicate matter of ‘flex-security’ or ‘flexicurity’. 
We will proceed in three steps: (1) after methodological remarks, we will look for a 
sociological definition of ‘flexicurity’ in an inductive way: because the notion 
originated in the Netherlands and in Denmark, it is essential to grasp how it was 
used with respect to the empirical situation of both countries; (2) this will lead us to 
try and generalize the ambiguous definition of ‘flexicurity’, both as a system of in-
teractions and as a policy – a policy having at least two sides: (a) it is brought to 
existence by way of a political discourse, a political intent, based on référentiels – 
to follow Jobert and Muller (1987), here – and (b) it is made of actual programmes 
with distinctive means: pieces of law, funds, human resources, the mobilising of ac-
tors, etc. (3) Finally we will assess the analytical potential of the notion for social 
science usage. 
 
1 I would like to thank Flemming Larsen for reading an intermediary version of this text. Of course, mis-
takes are mine. I also thank WWW. 
2 For the distinction notion/concept in French and English, see Barbier (2005a: 59). 
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1 -For an inductive notion of ‘flexicurity’: empirical origins 
 
‘Flexicurity’ was apparently used first to describe the outcome of a collectively de-
cided reform in the Netherlands, from the mid-90s. Wilthagen (1998) was the first 
to tell this story in detail3. The same author later noted that “the concept of flexicu-
rity is increasingly being taken up in other countries” (Wilthagen and Tros 2003: 
12). Indeed, towards the late 90s, the term was used by diverse actors (especially 
Danish scholars and, later, politicians) to describe the Danish situation. It is cer-
tainly through the example of what has often been called the ‘Danish model’ in the 
media that ‘flexicurity’ crossed the boundaries of social policy and labour market 
forums and networks, from the early years 2000. The OECD explicitly concurred in 
that outcome  along with the European Commission. 
 
A Dutch gender-biased ‘flexicurity’? 
 
Specialists generally consider that the Dutch reforms were pioneers in its invention.  
One of the important Dutch laws, enforced from the beginning of 1999, was pre-
cisely termed: Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid (Flexibility and Security Act) and it 
profoundly reformed part-time work, agency work and their associated social pro-
tection in this country. Wilthagen (1998: 13) and Wilthagen and Rogowski (2002: 
250-257) have attributed the invention of the term in the Dutch context to a senior 
sociologist and policy adviser of the then government. Wilthagen and his col-
leagues were probably among the main actors to contribute to the installation of the 
word as a common notion in the Netherlands’ policy forums. In a later formulation, 
the same author defined ‘flexicurity’ as a ‘nexus’ (Wilthagen 2002: 29) but it was 
not clear what a nexus exactly was for him, when he compared it to the ‘labour-
capital nexus’; later, with his colleague Tros (Wilthagen and Tros 2003: 4) they 
presented ‘flexicurity’ as a “policy strategy”, slightly changing the definition given 
by Wilthagen and Rogowski (2002: 250). Freed from its Dutch origin, the defini-
tion of ‘flexicurity’ as a ‘strategy’, now seems to have won the day in various in-
ternational publications (European Commission 2006b: 77). 
 
It is important to note here that, in their first papers, Wilthagen and his colleagues 
kept drawing upon their empirical review of Dutch labour market reform. In a sec-
ond stage, it was possible for them to use ‘flexicurity’ as a far reaching notion that 
could apply in various national contexts, as well as relating it to the broader Euro-
pean Employment Strategy context (Wilthagen and Tros 2003: 1-2, for instance). 
The Dutch reforms they reviewed were identified as starting explicitly under the 
banner of ‘flexibility’ and ‘security’ from 1995 – where a ministerial memorandum 
was issued under the very label under the rule of the Labour Party; but Wilthagen 
 
3 He was later nominated as a member of the “Expert group on flexicurity” by the DG Employment and 
Social Affairs, along with six other experts. 
 4
showed that this had older roots in the past negotiation between government and 
the social partners, and in a particular form of what he terms the Dutch ‘corporatist 
system’ out of which, in a way ‘flexicurity’ emerged as an “unanticipated process” 
(1998: 10) of the actions and initiatives of the Dutch government and social part-
ners. 
 
Given this empirical review and other research (see for instance, Van Oorschot 
2001), the reforms that can be grouped under a programme or a strategy of ‘flexicu-
rity’ pertain to a long term process of reducing the inequalities of social protection 
rights in the 90s for ‘atypical’ and ‘regular’ employees; during this process, the 
regulation of fixed-term and temporary agency work was reformed, leading to fos-
tering enhanced rights to open-ended contracts; the dismissal procedures were also 
reviewed during the period (Wilthagen 2002: 14). 
 
As a consequence, it is interesting to understand to what extent the Dutch ‘activity 
and employment regime4’ was transformed over the last decade and to compare it 
with the Danish one, using the French regime as a mirror case (tables 1 to 4). 
 
Table 1 – Activity rates (population 15-64) 
% The Netherlands Denmark France 
 1994 1999 2005 1994 1999 2005 1994 1999 2005 
Activity rate all 
 
68.8 74.1 76.9 79.5 80.6 79.8 67.5 68.7 69.5 
Activity rate men 
 
79.7 82.9 83.7 84.2 84.9 83.6 74.9 75.3 75.1 
Activity rate women 57.7 65.2 70.0 74.6 76.1 75.9 60.3 62.3 64.1 
Source: Employment in Europe 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 We defined such a regime in Barbier (1998: 398): ”Within a specific national territory, an activity and 
employment regime represents a given historical state of the distribution of employment and activity, 
among the potentially active population. This distribution is consistent with and facilitated by a specific 
system of social protection for non-workers and workers, the distribution being visible according to stan-
dard categories such as qualifications, gender, age, etc, and related to the sharing of responsibility for do-
mestic activities (including childcare and care for the elderly). These constantly changing regimes (as 
shown, for instance, in the increase in female labour market participation after the war in industrialised 
countries) are nonetheless stable over relatively long periods of time within their own national frame-
work.” Our definition is different from other usages of ‘employment regime’ [(for instance: Muffels et al. 
2002, cf. also Gautié’s approach (1998)]. 
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Table 2 – Employment rates Full time equivalent (population 15-64) 
% The Netherlands Denmark France 
FTE 1994 1999 2005 1994 1999 2005 1994 1999 2005 
Employment rate all 
 
51.3 56.8 56.4 65.6 69.7 68.1 56.2 57.3 58.5 
Employment rate men 
 
68.9 73.8 71.7 74.0 77.6 75.6 67 67.8 66.9 
Employment rate 
women 
33.8 40.0 41.7 57.5 62.1 61.1 45.8 47.2 50.8 
Source: Employment in Europe 2006 
 
 
Table 3 – Part-time employment (population 15-64) 
% The Netherlands Denmark France 
 1994 1999 2005 1994 1999 2005 1994 1999 2005 
Part time all 
 
36.7 39.7 46.1 21.7 21.6 22.1 15.2 17.1 17.2 
Part time men 
 
16.3 18.0 22.6 10.5 10.4 12.7 4.8 5.5 5.7 
Part time women 66.1 68.9 75.1 35.0 34.7 33.0 28.3 31.4 30.7 
Source: Employment in Europe 2006 
 
 
Table 4 – Fixed-term contracts (population 15-64) 
% The Netherlands Denmark France 
 1994 1999 2005 1994 1999 2005 1994 1999 2005 
Fixed term all 
 
11.3 12.3 15.5 11.6 9.6 9.8 11.5 14.5 13.3 
Fixed term men 
 
8.6 9.7 14.3 10.8 8.6 8.5 10.4 13.7 12.6 
Fixed term women 15.1 15.6 16.9 12.4 10.7 11.3 12.8 15.4 14.0 
Source: Employment in Europe 2006 
 
With regard to the possible impact of the introduction of ‘flexicurity’ strategies in 
the Netherlands, we can make the following observations, related to the period 
1994-2005. The activity rates of women have steadily increased over the period and 
their increase was not higher after the 1999 Act; this Act has apparently not led ei-
ther to a significant increase of female full-time equivalent employment rates, that 
have gradually increased over the entire period. However, the main changes ob-
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served from 1999 are in the increase of part-time prevalence, both for men and 
women, and also for fixed-term contracts, essentially for men (table 4). This leads 
to identifying one important feature of the Dutch situation with regard to ‘flexicu-
rity’; the decrease of inequalities between different types of contracts and the facili-
tation of ‘atypical’ work seem to have concurred in stabilising the division of la-
bour between men and women, despite the increased resort by men to ‘flexible’ 
contracts. The Dutch way of ‘flexicurity’ is, in this respect, gender-biased and can-
not be linked – whatever the ‘unanticipated’ effects were – to a ‘universalistic’ 
strategy. 
 
Comparing countries two by two, the main observations are the following: 
 
- Irrespective of the wide-ranging differences that exist between the French and 
Dutch systems of social protection and labour law (including their industrial 
relations systems) the main difference that contrasts France and the Nether-
lands with respect to their activity and employment regimes, pertains to the 
pattern of female labour market participation. Basically, the contribution of 
women to the labour force has remained much lower in the Netherlands than 
in France although the gap has slightly narrowed [table 2 shows that the FTE 
employment rate is higher in France for women by 9 points (the difference 
was 12 points in 1994)]. This is consistent with (a) a higher Dutch female ac-
tivity rate and (b) a widely diverging role of part-time work between the two 
countries (table 3); the role played by fixed-term contracts5 does not appear 
to be great in explaining this difference. 
- When one compares Denmark and the Netherlands, the gender-biased pattern 
again comes to the fore, actually even more strongly than in the former com-
parison. Danish use of part-time work is higher than in France, especially for 
women, but not much for men: the French and Danish situations are much 
closer to one another than to the Dutch. Here again the resort to so-called 
‘fixed-term’ contracts does not seem to explain much. Either for men or 
women, Danish and Dutch activity rates are very close but their FTE em-
ployment rates differ widely. Here again the main explanation is to be found 
in the role of women: table 2 shows that FTE employment rates for Dutch 
males are only slightly lower than for Danish males [with France this male 
rate differs by 5 points (France-the Netherlands) and by nearly ten points 
(France-Denmark) and, in both cases, it is explained by the concentration of 
employment in France on the 25-60 age bracket]. 
 
Before turning now to presenting a short story of the use of ‘flexicurity’ in the Dan-
ish context, we will also proceed to another comparison between the same three 
countries, in terms of the role played by labour law. The OECD has been compar-
 
5 Moreover, as we showed, the ’fixed-term’ or ’temporary’ Eurostat rates are basically flawed because of 
their intrinsic heterogeneity (Barbier 2005c; 2007b). 
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ing indicators of what it calls ‘employment protection legislation’ for quite a long 
time now. In their Employment Outlook report where they displayed a review of 
what they called the “Danish flexicurity approach” (OECD, 2004, p. 97-98), the or-
ganisation also updated its data base. The aggregated indicators are presented in ta-
ble 5 for the three countries, using the categories employed by OECD. 
 
Table 5 – OECD “Summary indicators of the strictness of employment protec-
tion legislation”, late 1990s and 2003. 
 Regular employ-
ment 
Temporary em-
ployment 
Collective dis-
missals 
Overall EPL 
 Late 
1990s 
2003 Late 
1990s 
2003 Late 
1990s 
2003 Late 
1990s 
2003 
The Netherlands 3.1 3.1 1.2 1.2 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.3 
Denmark 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 3.9 3.9 1.8 1.8 
France 2.3 2.5 3.6 3.6 2.1 2.1 2.9 2.9 
Source: Employment Outlook, 2004, p. 117. 
 
Many remarks could be made about the OECD approach and its methodological 
limits, that we will leave aside for the moment. Table 5 shows that the picture is 
false although often disseminated, according to which in Denmark hiring and firing 
is practically free of any limits: Denmark scores the highest of the three countries 
for collective dismissals. Gaudu (2007) already warned against the superficial view 
of Denmark in France (see also Barbier, 2007a). It is remarkable that France, with a 
reputation for constantly featuring among the hardcore ‘continental’ champions in 
terms of structural labour market rigidity, scores lower than Denmark and the 
Netherlands for collective dismissals; true it scores much higher than both countries 
for ‘temporary employment6’, but for ‘regular employment’, it scores significantly 
lower than the Netherlands, which scores at a figure double the Danish one. What is 
remarkable in this comparison is that each country scores the lowest for one of the 
three indicators: France for collective dismissals, Denmark for regular employment 
and the Netherlands for temporary employment. 
 
The above empirical comparisons, both in terms of ‘activity and employment re-
gimes’ and in terms of the assumed variation of the strictness of labour law, clearly 
demonstrate that it takes more in-depth analysis to understand the relative perform-
ance of countries than the superficial political discourse about ‘flexicurity’ would 
show for amateur comparativists. The ‘flexicurity’ empirical picture will be further 
complicated by a quick survey of the use of ‘flexicurity’ in Denmark. 
 
 
6 For a methodological discussion of what ’temporary employment’ is in international data bases, see Bar-
bier 2007b. 
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Some Danish empirical history7
 
Doing in-depth comparative research in Denmark (Barbier 2006b), we tried to 
identify the essential steps of the dissemination of the idea and the formulation of 
‘flexicurity’, in the administrative and political forums on the one hand and in the 
academic ones on the other.  
The first formulation of the phenomenon that was later to be called ”flexicurity” in 
Denmark is linked to the designing of a ”golden triangle” by officials in the minis-
try of employment (Jørgensen et Pedersen 20048). As Per K. Madsen has observed, 
they first popularised the chart in a report published by the ministry in 19999, 
though they did not speak about flexicurity. Moreover, they insisted  that the virtu-
ous combination of the relationships (between labour legislation, unemployment 
insurance, employment creation and active labour market policies) that they com-
bined in their ”triangle” were linked to the specific Danish social context (id. p. 93-
9410). It is no use to reprint once again the famous triangle which eventually found 
its way even into the 2004 issue of  Employment Outlook (page 97). 
At about the same time, researchers and academics were beginning to use the term 
‘flexicurity’ to describe the Danish system. Per Kongshøj Madsen is the first to 
make a consistent reference to it from 1999, but, if I don’t misinterpret his words, 
he only explicitly used the term ‘flexicurity’ for describing the ‘Danish model’ 
from 200311. P.K. Madsen provided a list of specific characteristics pertaining to 
this ”model” (2003: 4-5) : a flexible labour market with a high level of external 
flexibility that is permitted by a low level of employment protection; a generous in-
come replacement for the unemployed; and active labour market policies that allow 
for enhancing training and qualifications. Later on (Madsen 2006: 349-352), in his 
list of features for the Danish ‘flexicurity’ system, he distinguished between “basic 
traits” and “specific developments in the 1990s”, implying that some long-term fea-
tures had been playing a role in the present situation. Moreover, noting that “mac-
roeconomic environment” played a role, he included an item termed ”political envi-
ronment” that encompassed not only the role of social partners, corporatist struc-
tures (“small-state democratic corporatism”) and political support in society for re-
 
7 For the reconstruction of this short story, I am heavily indebted to the people I interviewed and who 
were as kind as indicating me sources in Danish, which they sometimes helped me translating, when my 
rudimentary Danish was insufficient. Prominent among them are my colleagues of Carma, the University 
of Aalborg. Thanking them warmly, I am aware that I will have to account for my own mistakes in the 
eventual interpretation I give here. A more detailed analysis, in the context of the European social model, 
is forthcoming in Barbier 2007c. 
8 The 2004 edition I quote is the 7th edition of the well-known textbook in Denmark. 
9 « Arbejdsreformerne – en status », 1999, København (Arbejdsministeriet).  
10 “Særligt ved sammenligning med continental-europæiske lande og de øvrige nordiske lande et det 
nærliggende at undestrege sammenhængen mellem ansættelsesforhold og indretningen af 
dagpengesystemet og aktiveringsindsatsen i Danmark”. 
11  Madsen quoted the « golden triangle » from the 1999 Danish report (Madsen 2003: 101) when he con-
tributed to an ILO comparative study (Auer and Cazes 2003). 
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forms; he described an ”implicit social contract concerning balance between flexi-
bility and security”. Other recent analyses converge and attribute to flexicurity an 
even more encompassing meaning: it seems that for some Danish researchers, 
flexicurity could mean a global social consensus that encompasses extremely com-
prehensive, complex and far reaching dimensions because it has lasted for the last 
75 years (Kristensen 2006: 300) or because it is intimately linked to the nature of 
the Danish legal system (Rasmussen 2006: 242-243). 
 
Danish politicians also claimed the term. The former Social Democrat Prime Min-
ister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen recently commented about the policies he imple-
mented (1993-2001), as an instance of the realisation of flexicurity in the following 
terms: « the combination of flexible labour markets and individual social security – 
of the Northern countries is [..] based on a) strong social security and broad wel-
fare provisions ; b) active labour market and educational policies ; and c) a highly 
mobile labour market, where the social partners (trade unions and employers’ as-
sociations) are key actors with a high degree of responsibility for competitiveness 
and social sustainibility» (2005: 51). It should be noted that his description pre-
cisely does not limit itself to a mechanism, because he stresses the role of actors 
and their ”high degree of responsibility”. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the current con-
servative Prime minister has, for his part, implied, but only in front of domestic au-
diences, that he was the inventor of the term. He did it on the 21st of November, 
2004, at his party’s congress, pretending that he innovated in putting both terms to-
gether12. From what we learned the claim is certainly far-fetched.  
 
What can we then conclude from the identification of the Danish contribution to the 
dissemination of the term ”flexicurity”? Danish academics all stress the fact that 
there is much more than the simple mechanism of a ”triangle”, which was so 
promptly jumped upon by so many hasty analyses13. The basis for the sheer possi-
bility of the triangle’s working profoundly lies in the intimate social fabric of Den-
mark. Danish politicians have also adopted the term and tend to use it – whatever 
their diverse personal contribution to the building of the successful ‘Danish model’ 
 
12 ”Vi havde EU topmøde forleden. Der havde jeg lejlighed til at  fortælle lidt om det. Den drøftelse forgik 
jo på engelsk. Jeg  kombinerede de to ord og sagde, at vi har ’flexibility’ og  ’security’, og så kaldte jeg 
den danske model for "flexicurity". Det er godt, for på fransk hedder det ’flexicurité’”. [the other day, we 
had a European summit. There I had the opportunity to tell a little about it. The discussion was held in 
English. I combined the two words and said that we have  ”flexibility” and ”security”, and called the Dan-
ish model ”flexicurity”. It is good because in French they say  ”flexicurité” – our translation]. 
13 Flexicurity is often reduced to a wishful simplistic mechanism. In such visions, Danes tend to recall 
the Brits of whom George Orwell thought, in 1941, that they would welcome socialism. In his The lion 
and the unicorn, he wrote “From the moment that all productive goods have been declared the prop-
erty of the State, the common people will feel, as they cannot feel now, that the State is themselves 
[author’s emphasis], they will be ready to endure the sacrifices that are ahead of us, war or no war” 
(Penguin, 1941, p. 106). 
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– as emblematic of the example that today’s Denmark can provide Europe with. In 
the European debate, and especially in the European Commission and other inter-
national organisations like the OECD, the stress put by academics upon the social 
conditions for the virtuous connections between social protection and the labour 
market is generally omitted or downplayed (Jørgensen, 2002). This should not be a 
matter for surprise when we consider that international organisations are looking 
for ”good practices” in the hope for ”transferring” those to other countries. The re-
peated caution asked for by Danish colleagues (for a recent recapitulation, see 
Bredgaard et al. 2005) does not trouble international organisations much.  
 
After this first inductive research, where do we stand? What is obvious is that, from 
the limited information compared in both countries, their activity and employment 
regimes stand widely apart. Compared to the Danish, the Dutch is heavily gender- 
biased: whereas a system of interactions (the ‘triangle’) seems to apply rather uni-
versally in Denmark, the flexicurity virtuous circle mainly concerns women in the 
Netherlands14. If we single out three elements to close this first empirical approach, 
table 6 shows remaining differences between the two countries. Two common ele-
ments stand out in the table: both countries have a mix of collective agreements and 
labour laws, but this mix – however deeply embedded in their respective forms of 
corporatism – is substantially different, which gives ambiguous outcomes as to 
whether labour law should be considered ‘flexible’ evenly across both countries 
(see also table 5) 
 
Table 6 – Comparing Denmark’s and the Netherlands’ ‘flexicurity’ 
Flexicurity  Denmark The Netherlands 
Gender dimension Universalistic Gendered 
Social embeddedness corporatist corporatist 
Labour law and collective 
agreements 
Mixed, combining high protec-
tion from collective dismissals 
with corporatism 
 
Mixed, combining high protec-
tion for open-ended contracts 
with corporatism 
 
 
It is now necessary to go beyond and try to see whether a more generalized socio-
logical approach is possible to understand ‘flexicurity’ independently of its histori-
cal roots in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
14 In a way, it is not surprising that ”combination security” (“the security of a worker of being able to 
combine his or her job with other – notably private – responsibilities and commitments than paid work”) 
(Wilthagen and Tros 2003: 6) was first particularly stressed in the Dutch context, with its gender-biased 
feature. 
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2 - Looking for a comprehensive definition of ‘flexicurity’ 
 
The task of a comprehensive review of the uses of ‘flexicurity’ across Europe is 
obviously beyond reach. In its comparative chapter about the theme, the European 
Commission (2006b: 75-118) has implemented a benchmarking exercise, mobilis-
ing a certain number of indicators and combining an Principal Components Analy-
sis (PCA) with a clustering of countries. They mainly use four indicators: the 
‘strictness of employment protection legislation’; expenditure on labour market 
policies; the share of participants in life-long programmes and the average tax-
wedge, and their analysis ends up in a grouping of countries into “five flexicu-
rity/labour market systems” (European Commission 2006b: 102-109), as is shown 
in table 7. Remarkably, social dialogue does not figure among the indicators cho-
sen, whereas its role is constantly stressed by researchers (Madsen 2006; Auer 
2006). 
 
Table 7 – “flexicurity/labour market” clusters in Europe  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Employment in Europe, 2006 
 
Moreover, the remarkable achievement of this sophisticated benchmarking against 
a spate of indicators leaves open the question of the definition of ‘flexicurity’: it 
implicitly starts from the premise that there exists a ‘universal’ form of flexicurity 
that can be captured by a list of indicators.  
 
To try and be as comprehensive as possible, a sociological approach has to fulfil 
three main tasks: describing, explaining and understanding; these tasks are (and 
should be) distinct from a potential assessment or relative valuation of performance 
of the type benchmarking implements. In table 8, we distinguish between research 
tasks and other activities linked to politics. Social science research figures on the 
upper left of the table (analytical-positive goals) while normative activities appear 
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on the right side; some activities are in-between (analytical and normative: this is 
the case of benchmarking but, more broadly, of many economic studies15). 
 
Reviewing usages of the term ‘flexicurity’ leads to distinguishing two main possi-
ble definitions, which are not exclusive from one another: (a) flexicurity as a pol-
icy/strategy and (b) flexicurity as a system of elements. In the first case, the policy 
explicitly states that it pursues the goal of reconciling flexibility on the one hand, 
and security on the other. In the second, it is a system16 inserted within a society 
that is instrumental in provoking the reconciling. A policy/strategy (a) can obvi-
ously be seen as part of a system (b) of flexicurity.  
 
Of course many interrogations arise as to the dimensions of flexibility and security. 
It is essential to recall that the notion comes to be discussed in a definite context, 
i.e., the present flexibilisation trend that is driven by globalisation. The ultimate ba-
sic rationale for flexibility lies in the contemporary transformation of international 
monetary norms and labour cost competition; as empirical data amply demonstrate 
in Europe, the gradual flexibilisation of jobs has entailed the degradation of condi-
tions of work and protection for a significant part of the population, especially 
those with lower qualifications. It is then highly improbable that, against this com-
mon and powerful economic background, institutional arrangements will be easily 
built to marry flexibility and security, unless equally strong social conditions for 
negotiations, compromise and the redistribution of resources are met. However, the 
economic constraint is one of labour flexibility – labour as a factor of production, 
for reasons of cost competition – which can be disconnected from employment 
flexibility (Barbier and Nadel 2000; 2003). This distinction and further dimensions 
of flexibility and security have now been systematically explored in Wilthagen’s 
“matrix” (European Commission 2006b: 78). 
  
Flexibility as a ‘strategy’ belongs to the first category, while flexibility as a ‘nexus’ 
(a social relationship), a ‘golden triangle’ or a ‘system’ belongs to the second. So-
ciological policy analysis distinguishes between ideational dimensions of policies, 
as opposed to their material elements. This is why, in table 8, we separate (a1) po-
litical discourses from (a2) programmes and actors. Discourses can take many as-
pects: while they convey cognitive messages, they are also instrumental (conflicts 
of power), normative and sometimes manipulative (in the case of political commu-
nication, for instance). According to Jobert and Muller’s (1987) analysis, they con-
 
15 Without discussing them here, we follow Passeron’s classical distinctions (Passeron 2006) between 
“historical sciences” (sociology, history, political science, etc..) and “Popperian” sciences (economics and 
demographics). Moreover, economic research is very commonly linked to the pursuit of prescriptions, 
which is not the case for historical sciences. 
16 Actually, a sub-system centred on the labour market (Barbier 2007a). Wilthagen and Tros (2003: 5) 
also write: “flexicurity could not merely be seen as a species of labour market policy/strategy but also a 
certain “state” or condition of the labour market”. 
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vey values, norms, images, but also ‘algorithms’ (i.e. normative theories of action). 
For instance actors discussing about ‘flexicurity’ in the European Parliament op-
pose one another about the mere possibility of flexicurity: some see it as a chimera, 
some as an interesting strategy or a plausible theory of action for a programme. 
 
Once elements and some interactions are identified, the task remains as to objecti-
fying and explaining their aggregate functioning: here we enter the domain of 
flexicurity as a system (b), as a complex web of interactions, complementarities, 
etc.. between various sub-systems within a particular society. For instance, in one 
country, it is possible that flexicurity policies were implemented, and that they 
failed, whereas in another country, a flexicurity policy was implemented and con-
tributed to making the twin objectives compatible, also because the history of the 
country and its institutions allowed for doing the right choices at the right moment. 
Both political discourses and the implementation of specific programmes partici-
pate in the achievement of the goal of ‘flexicurity’ as a system. Discourses are ob-
viously essential for furthering interests. 
 
Contrasting the French and Danish situations with the grid in table 8 
 
The implications of our distinction will be clearer if we contrast the French and the 
Danish situations. France is a country characterised by a high level of union frag-
mentation and a low union density, where a relatively high level of social conflict 
accompanies the implementation of reforms, with great uncertainty about eventual 
outcomes. In this country, labour law overwhelmingly prevails over collective 
agreements. Often, as was the case again in 2005-2006, with Prime Minister de 
Villepin, the government tries and passes Bills in Parliament to reform either social 
protection or labour law, without really consulting with social partners or unions. 
This often leads to reforms being controversial and provides legitimate motives for 
conspicuous street demonstrations17. In 2005-2006, the government was proud of 
his success in introducing a new employment contract (contrat nouvelle embauche, 
August 2005) with shorter notice periods, for firms with less than 20 staff, and it 
thought the introduction of an additional one of a similar type for the young was 
going to be easy in early 2006. The de Villepin government always claimed that 
 
17 During the 90s, apart from a period of intense demonstrations triggered by Prime minister Balladur 
in 1994 over a government proposal to create a special contract with a lower minimum wage for the 
young, two main significant social movements took place. The first one (winter 1995) was organised 
over pensions in the public sector and the healthcare insurance reform; the second (winter 1997-98), 
over the situation of the unemployed, was organised by the unemployed’s NGOs. A fourth moment 
was the reform of the unemployment insurance. Although it did not spark off demonstrations in any 
way comparable to the 1994, 1995 and 1997 waves, it did indeed provoke very active and fierce de-
bate. On a smaller scale, recurrent debate and strikes supported by the unions have also accompanied 
the series of the most significant (and media reported) waves of redundancies.  
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this was a policy initiative due to its learning from Denmark (Barbier 2005b; 
2006a; 2007a). But the reform for the new contract for the young was eventually 
defeated in the streets. When presenting his ‘social testament’, de Villepin con-
cluded that at all costs France would have to find a “flexicurité à la française18”. 
The French case illustrates the fact that a strategy was attempted to introduce vari-
ous reforms that, may at first sight pass for a ‘flexicurity strategy’. Because of the 
failure of the government to really implement the strategy, the French situation of 
the labour market remained for a great part unchanged19. Hence, one year on, the 
Prime Minister acknowledged that reforms for flexicurity as he saw it were still 
projects for the future. Consequently, it would certainly be difficult to describe the 
French system as allowing for the combination of flexicurity and security, along the 
Wilthagen’ and Tros’ s definition quoted by the Commission report (European 
Commission 2006b: 77), i.e. “ a degree of job, employment, income and combina-
tion security that facilitates the labour market careers and biographies of workers 
with a relatively weak position and allows for enduring and high quality labour 
market participation and social inclusion, while at the same time providing a degree 
of numerical (both external and internal) functional and wage flexibility that allows 
for labour markets’ (and individual companies’) timely and adequate adjustment to 
changing conditions in order to maintain and enhance competitiveness and produc-
tivity”. While analysing France in the context of a comparative project about the 
precariousness of employment in Europe, we showed that one of the most con-
spicuous and prominent features of the French system lay in the fact that the nega-
tive consequences of flexibility on the labour market were concentrated on certain 
groups who additionally lacked access to mainstream social protection rights, while 
at the same time being trapped in lower quality jobs. This was the case even in the 
presence of relatively well developed policies against ‘employment precarious-
ness’, and explicitly designed to foster ‘security’ (Barbier et al. 2002a).  
 
By contrast, in Denmark, politicians and academics adopted the term ‘flexicurity’ 
for policies that, in the first place, were not conceived of as ‘flexicurity’ strategies, 
the term coming only later to Danish forums. These policies have amply shown that 
the present Danish situation fits reasonably well in Wilthagen and Tros’s definition, 
as is demonstrated by many researchers already quoted: moreover, most of these 
Danish scholars tend to think that the elements of the ‘flexicurity” system in Den-
mark have roots in a rather long past history that is key to understanding today’s 
performances (Madsen 2006; Kristensen 2006). Last but not least, the elements 
which Danish scholars tend to associate with features of the Danish flexicurity sys-
tem are hardly if at all heard of, or documented in the French case: for instance, the 
 
18 Prime Minister’s speech at the Conseil économique et Social, February, 26, 2007 where he told there 
were three main axes for this future “flexicurité à la française”: reforming labour law; reforming voca-
tional training, and reforming the Public employment service. 
19 Not homogenously ‘rigid’ as is shown in table 5, the French score is especially high for fixed-term em-
ployment. 
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French system of unemployment assistance and insurance is very ungenerous when 
compared to the Danish, and the system of active labour market programmes in 
France is much less effective than the Danish. Moreover, the contrast is maybe at 
its highest for the support for reform in both countries and for the widely diverging 
systems of industrial relations, not to mention the basic rules of the French polity. 
 
To sum up our findings so far, it is possible to find two countries with explicit 
flexicurity policies that are quite at odds with each other in terms of their substance. 
Secondly, these policies can be consistent with a wider societal functioning, as in 
the case of Denmark, but they may also appear as inconsistent with it, as in the case 
of France. This brings an additional puzzle to the fore, which is exemplified by the 
Danish case: what is the role of history in ‘flexicurity’? Apparently, from the mid-
90s to now, and into the years 2000, the ‘fit’ between a flexicurity strategy and the 
functioning of the labour market and of social protection is of a great quality and, 
even, sustainability for the near future seems probable, despite some caveats 
(Mardsen 2006: 366-374). But, at the same time, features deeply embedded in the 
Danish society also figure among the explanatory causes or variables for account-
ing for the present success, as Madsen (2006) and Kristensen (2006) suggest. Seen 
in this light, the Danish flexicurity system is a complex web of interactions, of col-
lective action and of individual adaptation to societal norms and rules (Barbier 
2007a), which is in a way unique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Social science research about ‘flexicurity’: mapping tasks and approaches of concepts 
Tasks Tasks Social science (analytical-positive) Analytical and normative: in-
between activities (economics) 
Normative 
activities 
Describing Describing ‘flexicurity’=> its ele-
ments and the ‘system’ they make 
 
-Elements 
-System of interactions (institutions, 
rules) 
 
Identifying 
a – policies 
1) discourses (cognitive) 
of which: référentiels (values, norms, images and 
algorithms) 
2) actors and their strategies, programmes imple-
mented 
b – phenomena, institutions and arrangements: 
elements that are candidates for featuring within 
an analytical (universal) stylised framework/ sys-
tem of flexicurity 
-  interactions between elements 
 Political discourse about 
elements of flexicurity 
 
Articulated by actors 
participating in the 
promotion/demotion of 
flexicurity as a political 
strategy 
(politicians, experts, 
academics, etc) 
Explaining 
And  understand-
ing  
Causal attribution/ ‘affinities’) 
of effects/situations, etc.. 
to the impact of  
 
the elements/the system of flexicu-
rity 
- Explaining actors’ strategies 
- Attributing changes (dependent variables) in 
certain phenomena to public activi-
ties/strategies/institutions and the system they 
build with actors’ responses, strategies 
- Assessing potential effects of ideas 
Evaluation studies and bench-
marking: mainstream econom-
ics/correlations, etc. , economet-
rics 
Political discourse about 
the goals of flexicurity 
 
(idem) 
Valuing/assessing 
 
Recommendations for  
policy makers 
 
 Economic studies, modelizing 
strategies, based on stylised 
facts, leading to one or more 
‘better strategies’ => ‘policy les-
sons’ 
 
Political communication 
as legitimation/de-
legitimation discourses 
for strategies 
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At first sight, the choice to consider ‘flexicurity’ as a strategy or a policy is the 
less demanding. One can accept at face-value any policy or strategy that claims 
its ultimate goal is to foster the compatibility of any form of security and of any 
form of flexibility  in the area of work and social protection: social science be-
ing neutral, there is no reason to deny this acceptance, a priori. Sociology’s 
task, at a second stage could then be to classify different types of poli-
cies/strategies. One can distinguish between ‘flexicurity policies’ that are sym-
bolic in Edelman’s sense (1964) and those who give life to actual programmes 
and legislation. Obviously policy analysis is able to address the question of the 
effects of introducing such policies and to compare them with one another, sort-
ing them into types or models, linking them for instance to other regimes, like 
‘welfare regimes’. However, in this analysis two questions arise: (1) the first 
pertains to the added value of qualifying policies as ‘flexicurity’ ones instead of 
simply keeping naming them labour market and social protection policies; (2) 
the second pertains to the challenge of singling out ‘flexicurity policies’ as iden-
tifiable factors, leading to specific outcomes and comparing them with one an-
other across countries without ignoring their ‘context’. In this analysis one is 
confronted with the difficult task of explaining what is the particular role present 
policies (with distinctive features, and the central feature indeed of their goal of 
reconciliation) can play in a ‘holistic’ outcome – a “state” where, as Wilthagen’s 
and Tros’ definition suggested, combines a great number of phenomena. Hence, 
even in the case where one was able to identify a clear set of policies, with al-
most universal value20, and because present policies only constitute one possible 
factor, one is bound to analyse a ‘flexibility outcome’ (or degree or level) as the 
‘product’ of a system, a societal combination of sub-systems, placed in their his-
torical development and path-dependence, with a considerable interplay of fac-
tors. Here, Amable’s (2003) approach to ‘institutional complementarities’ is ex-
tremely useful. In sociology, establishing genuine causal links between present 
policies and an holistic ‘outcome’ or ‘state’ that characterizes a particular soci-
ety has always been especially tricky. Hence the ever lasting discussion about 
the degree of ‘causality’ which is present in Max Weber’s use of the term ‘af-
finities’, and which can be easily applied to the case of Denmark today (Barbier 
2007a). 
 
There is certainly little interest in trying to devise only a taxonomy of policies or 
strategies, that present themselves as pursuing the goal of reconciling the twin 
objectives of flexibility and security. What is more interesting (and important 
for policy lessons) is to test whether the specific analysis of national systems 
from the angle of ‘flexicurity’ yields innovative and useful findings, differing 
from the already existing comparisons of labour market and social protection 
regimes. In this respect, ‘flexicurity’ might even be seen as a possible ‘cross-
 
20 At least in the developed world. 
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regime’ dimension. This certainly does not downplay the interest of a so-to-say 
localised use of ‘flexicurity’, as a sort of yardstick to assess identified pro-
grammes in a particular context: for instance Leschke et al. (2006) have at-
tempted to discover whether piecemeal programmes (picked from the wider 
Hartz IV German reform) achieved a ‘local’ reconciliation of flexibility and se-
curity. Doing so, they very aptly pointed to the fact that it is insufficient to see 
‘flexicurity’ as simply a set of trade-offs and synergies (or complementarities): 
between flexibility and security, “vicious circles” could emerge, thus complicat-
ing Wilthagen’s original matrix (ibid.: 3-5). However useful for policy advising, 
such analyses have limits: one does not learn from them how the aggregation of 
various programmes translates into a holistic ‘state’ (or ‘degree’ or ‘level’) of 
‘flexicurity’; their second limitation is the absence of clearly identifiable, em-
pirical actors. Indeed the role of actors has probably been underestimated in a 
great part of the benchmarking literature dealing with ‘flexicurity’. 
 
Summing up the above discussion we can conclude that two options exist for 
social science: (1) From the first one (mainly open to economic studies) we may 
expect various complex exercises of benchmarking along the type presented by 
the European Commission in 2006 (see table 7 here). This option delivers little 
in terms of the definition of flexicurity: one indeed could even say that it is an 
adequate way of avoiding the difficult task of definition. The search for an ana-
lytical and theoretical definition is substituted by correlations, principal compo-
nent and cluster analyses. In a nutshell, this is an extension of previous analysis 
combining the review of labour market policies, labour law and unemployment 
compensation. In a way this amounts to a ‘trivialization’ of the interesting and 
challenging substantial features reviewed in section 1. (2) The second option is 
theoretically more demanding, as will be seen now. 
 
A theoretical basis for the identification of flexicurity systems? 
 
Undeniably, ‘flexicurity’, as it was conceived of at its origins (see section 1 
above) had to do with the result of social negotiation between politicians and 
social partners. It is not by chance that both the Netherlands and Denmark have 
a corporatist system of industrial relations. It is neither by chance that the notion 
of ‘trade-off’ was central since the beginnings of ‘flexicurity’: a trade-off over 
whatever, logically supposes that collective actors, at a certain point, are able to 
trade off something with one another21. Hence it seems quite logical to try and 
find bases for theorizing it among disciplinary approaches that pay central atten-
tion to corporatism and to the role of social compromises. In the political sci-
ence and sociological tradition, as well as in institutional economics, the ap-
 
21 True, there is also an individualistic approach to trade-offs, where individuals make trade-offs with 
one another, but we will leave aside this approach here. 
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proaches which immediately come to the mind centre on the question of ‘regula-
tion’ of society (in the sense of régulation in French and Regelung in German). 
In this perspective, apart from Mayntz and Scharpf’s “actor-centred institution-
alism” we find very useful support in Jobert’s approach (1998) and Boyer’s 
(1986) as well as Amable’s (2003). From a Jobertian perspective, the question 
of flexicurity boils down to the organisation of power relations between actors 
which are constructed into a ‘political order’ and ‘flexicurity’ is a political 
référentiel (cognitive frame) that can be used by certain actors to change the ex-
isting relationship. The French “regulation” school, with Boyer, has emphasised 
the key role played by “institutionalised compromises”22, which emerge from 
social conflicts and political processes (Boyer 2006). B. Amable, for his part, 
has produced an analysis of five types of capitalism (Market-based, Asian, Con-
tinental European, Social-democratic and Mediterranean) on the basis of the 
analysis of institutional complementarities linking together five sub-systems 
(product-market competition; wage-labour nexus; financial sector; social protec-
tion and education). 
 
In this perspective: (1) if flexicurity may be built as a concept, it would have to 
find its place at some crossing-point in the wider ‘wage-labour nexus’ (rapport 
salarial)23, and in the social protection institutional area24: for flexicurity to be-
come a significant feature of the wage-labour nexus, around the trade-offs, 
complementarities and vicious circles between the various forms of flexibility 
and security that various actors demand, accept or reject, compromises have to 
be institutionalized at national level. Hence flexicurity, quite different from a 
technical toolbox is, throughout, of a political nature. (2) secondly, it is neces-
sary to analyse more closely the relevant complementarities that are (or were) 
able to creating the conditions under which potential ‘flexicurity’ institutional 
compromises could be struck in the future (or have already been). 
 
 
22 Inspired notably by this perspective, we have proposed to analyse in details ‘flexibility-quality-
security regimes’ and, from this perspective, we have produced a cross-country analysis of France, It-
aly, Spain, Germany and the UK (Barbier et al., 2002b).  
23 In this “institutional area” (or institutional form – for Boyer), Amable (2003: 124-142), uses three 
indicators: employment protection; industrial relations; employment policy. In the “social-
democratic” model, Amable notes that “strong external competitive pressure requires some flexibility 
of the workforce. But flexibility is not simply achieved through lay-offs and market adjustments; re-
training of a highly-skilled workforce plays a crucial role in the adaptability of workers. Protection of 
specific investments of employees is realized through a mixture of moderate employment protection, a 
high level of social protection, and easy access to retraining thanks to active labour market policies. A 
coordinated wage-bargaining system enables solidaristic wage-setting which favours innovation and 
productivity. A centralized financial system enables firms to develop long-term strategies” (id.: 105-
107). In Amable’s typology, the Netherlands belong to the continental European type. 
24 In this “institutional area”, Amable (2003: 149-160) uses a number of indicators related to the 
structure of social protection. 
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Let’s risk the assumption here that, by introducing political regulation, power 
relationships and industrial relations systems, one would probably end up with 
the finding that, if it has any distinctive substantial content, ‘flexicurity’ fits only 
within certain types of capitalism. Whatever their important differences, both 
empirical examples studied in section 1 would pass the test of a negotiated na-
tional compromise with a majoritarian support leading to a substantive balance 
of security and flexibility among individual members of the workforce (and 
across households) (Barbier 2007a for Denmark). 
On both counts, for instance (i.e. the institutionalization of new compromises in 
society and the existence of institutional complementarities between ‘institu-
tional areas’) it would appear that flexicurity has been put at the core of the 
Danish system in the last decade, on the basis of a deeper and longer historical 
legacy. For the Netherlands, the passing of a new societal compromise is also 
well documented; how this fits into a wider complementarity with social protec-
tion also appears rather established, but with a different compromise, where 
women are not treated in an equal position within households. By contrast, the 
French situation cannot really be seen as having yielded any new compromise so 
far, at a time when fragmentation (social protection and labour market) and ine-
quality have increased (Barbier, 2007d). In this sense, the invention of a flexicu-
rity system has still to emerge in this country – notwithstanding its insertion in 
table 7 as a country of the continental ‘flexicurity’ cluster. To add another ex-
treme example, the recent introduction of ‘WorkChoices’, an Australian reform 
that allows for a complete ‘opt-out’ of employers and employees from labour 
law, can hardly pass as a type of ‘flexicurity’ where flexibility is at its maximum 
and security scores zero. We need now to turn to the right part of table 8 and 
deal with a complementary aspect of ‘flexicurity’, i.e. its politics. 
 
The importance of politics for ‘flexicurity’: a new référentiel? 
 
We have just seen that the concept of ‘flexicurity’ – if it can be eventually 
grasped – has to be intrinsically political. In table 8, we mention actors and their 
strategies and political discourses: their politics have to be included in the com-
prehension of ‘flexicurity’ as one ‘universal’ system (or many national systems), 
but we also have to focus on the contribution the EU-level makes to ‘flexicurity’ 
policies and politics. Additionally it is important to also consider the role re-
searchers play as experts in various forums and networks that deal with flexicu-
rity. 
 
As in many other social matters, an opposition between the national and the 
European levels is obvious. At national level, even when they are not termed 
explicitly so, the matters related to ‘flexicurity’ are hotly debated; by contrast, at 
EU-level, the now classical process of de-politicization (Radaelli 2003) seems to 
prevail. However, as will be seen, the opposition is not so simple. In national 
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politics, the contrast between France and Denmark is again prominent. In Den-
mark, although a divide and competition exists among parties and politicians 
about ‘flexicurity’, as we saw in section 1, Left and Right seem to combine in 
the common objective of reconciling the twin goals by implementing reforms 
over which they consult with one another; true, they implement different poli-
cies, but the general logic of the system remains unchanged. In France, by con-
trast, fierce opposition exists to the principle of ‘flexicurity’ not only from ex-
treme-left parties, but also from a significant part of one of the bigger unions. 
This is the case of CGT, of which only a fraction militates for the introduction 
of a ‘wage-earner status’, which would oblige employers to keep employment 
contracts alive during transitions, until employees have found another job25. 
CFDT, the other big union, militates in favour of more sectoral reforms to “se-
cure” the transitions from one to another job, and it stays cautious vis-à-vis the 
‘flexicurity’ framework. On the other hand, the employers’ associations are in 
favour of introducing new contracts with less obligations for employers in case 
of individual or collective dismissals. The large conflict sparked off by the in-
troduction of the new contract for the young (contrat première embauche, CPE) 
in spring 2006 was a typical conflict for the refusal of the sort of ‘flexicurity’ 
the French government was trying to introduce without negotiating with the un-
ions. These basic oppositions constitute a huge obstacle on the road to what 
would amount to a combined transformation of France’s ‘social dialogue’ and 
labour code. Hurdles are downplayed when ‘flexicurity’ is seen as the potential 
generalization of ‘best practice’ examples: this is for instance the case of Auer 
and Gazier (2006) who, convincingly detailing the real benefits of a selected 
group of sectoral reforms in France, tend to avoid the difficult question of their 
political pre-conditions. An EU-level general definition of a flexicurity strategy, 
like the one suggested by Wilthagen’s definition, leaves open a great number of 
normative and political questions which can only be solved by discussions and 
confrontations between political actors and social partners at national level: to 
take just one example, this definition normatively privileges “the careers and bi-
ographies of workers with a relatively weak position” (European Commission 
2006b: 77). Hence, a sociological approach to ‘flexicurity’ should explicitly 
recognize its politically conflictual aspect and should be able to map out the 
various interests of various groups towards reform at a given point: for instance, 
women and men, low skilled employees and the self-employed, civil servants 
with jobs for life and so on, owners of capital and workers, etc.  
 
The French case briefly mentioned here is no exception in ‘continental’ as well 
as in ‘liberal’ Europe: by contrast, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian coun-
tries rather appear as exceptions. Consequently, the EU-level de-politicized ap-
 
25 The question of how the funding of such a proposal could be possible has not been explained in de-
tail so far. 
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proach of ‘flexicurity’ is unlikely to bridge national controversies based on the 
confrontation of powerful interests. Additionally the politics of flexicurity take 
place at EU-level, while, on a formal basis, the present approach in forums and 
arenas tend to underestimate their role. Whereas the political and industrial rela-
tions dimension is clearly set as one of the crucial items in Madsen’s (2006) de-
finition26, the translation of the debate to the EU-level has tended to avoid it or 
mention it only perfunctorily. In their recent documents, the Commission and 
the Council tend to display a de-politicized version of ‘flexicurity’ that appar-
ently ignores politics, while they, themselves, as actors, are nevertheless fully-
fledged participants in the political debate over the development of European 
capitalisms. 
 
This empirical fact is well documented (Barbier 2004). It must be stressed that 
the reference to flexibility and security has been present for a long time in the 
various prescriptive frameworks adopted by EU institutions since the Delors 
White Paper adopted by the Council in 1993. Vague references were already 
present in the 1994 Essen priorities and the normative necessity of a “balance” 
between flexibility and security appeared in the first Amsterdam European Em-
ployment Strategy guidelines in Autumn 1997. The history of the new interest 
for this balance in the last years remains to be told27. To contribute to this analy-
sis, we will present an assumption to explain the emergence of the theme at EU-
level. This assumption certainly is, by itself, unable to account for the whole 
story but we think it is part of it. 
 
At a time when ‘flexicurity’ figured higher and higher on the Commission’s 
agenda, at the end of 2006, a special item was added to the Eurobarometer sur-
vey. The way it was done, we think, shed an interesting light over EU-level poli-
tics. In its Eurobarometer October 2006 survey (p. 14-15), the Commission in-
serted a section labelled “Europeans’ approval of the concept of flexicurity” and 
concluded it by saying that “a large majority of citizens agree with all the pro-
posals and thus indirectly agree with the concept of ‘flexicurity’ (between 72% 
and 88%)”. The proposals interviewees were deemed to agree with were pre-
 
26 In Amable’s approach, as we have already noted, the system of wage-setting is explicitly part of the 
definition of the Scandinavian type of capitalism. 
27 One of the important recent communications was made by V Spidla, the Commissioner for Em-
ployment and social affairs, on the 14th of September, 2005 [speech/05/506] where he argued: ”The 
Nordic 'flexicurity', which has quickly become 'this month's special offer' in the supermarket of ideas, 
is first of all this overall coherence between social security systems, the respective roles played by the 
government and the social parties, between employment policy and the workings of the labour mar-
ket.” (Speech/05/506, September, 14th). He concluded that Member states were to increase their 
economies and societies’ flexibility precisely through the introduction of new securities. From the end 
of 2005, the ‘flexicurity’ question was on the agenda of a number of meetings during the year 2006. 
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sented them one by one, within the frame of a single question28. The interpreta-
tion along which  the survey demonstrates an “indirect” support for ‘flexicurity’ 
is methodologically difficult to accept from a sociological point of view. How-
ever, when seen from the point of view of politics, this statement appears as a 
classical exercise of ‘political communication’. It is important to recall here that, 
after the double failure of the referendums in France and the Netherlands over 
the project for a constitutional treaty in 2005, the Commission decided to step 
up its communication policy. As the Spring Summit report went: “Last but not 
least, with only a few exceptions, public ownership of the Lisbon growth and 
jobs strategy falls short. Media coverage has also been fairly limited. We cannot 
yet say, therefore, that broad sections of the population have been made aware, 
let alone taken ownership, of the strategy. This points to the need for a dedicated 
communication strategy, making full use of economic analysis and showing 
how action will bring real benefits for individual citizens. Similarly, social part-
ners, who have an important role to play both as participants in the process and 
as message multipliers, should become more actively involved in the govern-
ance process.” (European Commission 2006a:7). In other words, the Commis-
sion attributed European citizens’ indifference or hostility to the Lisbon strategy 
to their insufficient information. Implicitly, this argument, at least as a partial 
one, was also used to account for the failure of the referendums in the Nether-
lands and in France in 2005. 
 
Issued during the same period, Employment in Europe (2006) conveys an analy-
sis which is strikingly convergent with this political analysis of the Commission. 
Notwithstanding the sophisticated analysis of ‘flexicurity’ proposed in the 
document, the “political” argumentation that serves as a framing29 to the analy-
sis can be summarized as follows: (1) because of the “challenge of globalisa-
tion”, Europeans fear flexibility [“large segments of the public seem to have 
come to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable dichotomy” (id.: 75) be-
tween flexibility and security; “anxieties about job losses and downward pres-
sure on wages and working conditions” (id.: 75) dominate]. (2) This leads to 
problems of “political feasibility” of reform (id.:112). (3) the “concept of 
flexicurity”, is useful because it calls “for appropriate combination of policies” 
(id.:112); hence the emergence of “a growing interest in the promotion and im-
plementation across Member States of ‘flexicurity principles’” (id.: 75). Conse-
quently, the innovation brought by the Commission in 2006 does not lie in the 
 
28 These were: « regular training improves one’s job opportunities »; « life time jobs with the same 
employer are a thing of the past »; « Being able to change easily from one job to another is a use-
ful asset to help people find a job nowadays »; « Work contracts should become more flexible to 
encourage job creation »; « In [OUR COUNTRY] many people retire too early » (QC 18: please 
tell me, for each of the following statements to what extent you agree or disagree with it). 
29 It is set at the beginning of the introduction and in the conclusions of chapter 2 of the Employment 
in Europe issue. 
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substantive content of the Lisbon strategy, already present from 1993/4 on; on 
the contrary it lies directly in the wording and the use of the “concept of flexicu-
rity”. Tipically this can be seen as the search for a new référentiel à la Jobert 
(1998).  
 
This innovation, (i.e. adopting the word flexicurity), it must be noted, did not 
occurr by chance and at any moment. It was also supported by governments 
from countries like Denmark (see the quotation by Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 
section 1) all active in what can be seen as a ‘war between social models’ at EU 
level between Member States (Barbier 2005a; Théret 2005). It happened at a 
moment when the Commission – destabilised by the consequences of the Dutch 
and French referendums – has been trying with much difficulty to counter its 
decrease of power and (especially for the ‘social actors’ within the Commission) 
to  fight against the relative depreciation of the OMC processes in the social 
domain. Hence, at the end of the day, it may well be the case that the activity 
initiated by the Commission (and approved by the Council) could be seen as a 
‘political communication’ exercise, to try and overcome some of the conse-
quences of the 2005 shock. Would this happen, the potential development of a 
new cognitive frame (référentiel), really instrumental, would be possible. 
 
However, the gap between the apparently de-politicized framing and wording of 
the ‘flexicurity’ question found in EU documents30 appears very clearly when 
one compare them with the substance of debates held in the European Parlia-
ment specialised commissions; in early 2007, the Employment and Social affairs 
Commission discussed ‘flexicurity’ in March and April31: in the March session, 
the Commission discussed the Green Paper and heard a report by Eurofounda-
tion experts G. Vermeylen and J. Hurley32; representatives of the Alliance of 
Liberal and Democrats of Europe (ALDE) and of the European Popular Party 
(EPP) mentioned that the notion of ‘flexicurity’ was “utterly artificial because 
flexibility and security were contradictory”, while other MEPs thought that, de-
spite its artificial character, it was possible to bring it to life; the Swedish Presi-
dent of the Commission mentioned that it was essential that all stakeholders 
should participate in the reform process so that street demonstrations could be 
avoided, and he raised the question as to whether there was a real “added value” 
for the European level in the matter. The Greek representative of the GUE/NGL 
group (which groups, inter alia, communist MEPs) was not convinced and 
thought that ‘flexicurity’ was akin to ‘flexploitation’. 
 
 
30 This discourse is displayed in various other documents, like for instance the more dedicated EES 
documents (for example, see the ‘Draft Joint employment report’, (6076/07, Feb, 7, 2007). 
31 Minutes by Confrontations (Brussels), March 21st, 2007, and April 11 and 12. 
32 “Varieties of flexicurity: reflections on key elements of flexibility and security”, Eurofoundation, 
21.3.2007. 
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In the light of such political controversy, which adequately mirrors the national 
debates in some Member states, it seems that the political dimension of ‘flexicu-
rity’ should be, from a sociological point of view, more clearly addressed. And 
indeed, it should also be addressed at EU-level, as the analysis above in terms of 
‘political communication’ hints at: we think that, after the 2005 debates in 
France and the Netherlands in 2005 (along with large debates in other countries 
about the ‘Services Directive’), an analysis that only focus on the ‘de-
politicized’ aspects of EU-level coordination of social policy (or the ‘European 
social model’ policies) will remain flawed. 
 
Finally, we would like to note briefly that the political nature of the EU-level 
policy discussions and processes have not been sufficiently taken into account 
so far in the interdisciplinary community of academics who engage in contrac-
tual research with the Commission (Barbier 2005a; 2007e). As table 8 clearly 
shows, academics – including of course this author – are often participants in the 
political processes. They ‘naturally’ participate in the production of the Com-
mission’s documents. When they are parties to research contracts, they are 
obliged to also produce ‘policy reports’ and ‘policy lessons’ for the Commission 
or their national governments. One too often tends to neglect that documents 
produced by the Commission are always political, exactly just as OECD ones 
are political documents – because the OECD is a political organisation with a 
political agenda dominated by the United States. Actually in both cases ‘hybrid’ 
documents are produced, with a varying mix of political dimensions and orienta-
tions and of analytical stuff drawn from academic research: the Employment in 
Europe 2006 (chapter 2) report is a striking example of this situation, as was 
analysed above. For economists, this is often not seen as a big problem, but for 
historical sciences (following Passeron 2006), we have proposed a number of 
guidelines to try and keep boundaries as clear as possible between research and 
politics: (1) an internal (independent) debate within the community should be 
preserved, which entails the necessity of distinguishing between standards for 
different types of texts, and different evaluation procedures and actors for such 
evaluation; (2) against the political tendency to select facts and sometimes twist 
them according to interests, researchers have to fight for the acceptance and the 
respect of (for) facts, even ‘annoying facts’ as Max Weber once said (1992: 
12933); (3) thirdly, also against the political practice, they have to be extremely 
rigorous in establishing causality; (4) this leads to a fourth guideline, which we 
have tried to abide by in the present text, and which calls for the precision of no-
tions and concepts; (5) and finally, again following Passeron (2006: 46), we so-
cial scientists have to defend ourselves from a certain danger of interpretative 
fantasy, a fantasy indeed very present in political forums and networks. 
 
 
33 « faits désagréables » in French. 
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3– Conclusion: a macro-concept of ‘flexicurity’? 
 
From the above discussion, a picture emerges: notably because its insertion in 
the political debate, and its very birth as a political discourse notion in the Neth-
erlands as well as its hybrid usage later in Denmark and on a wider European 
level, the concept of ‘flexicurity’ has still to be worked more in-depth. We hope 
to have brought here some more clarity to it, although we are certainly con-
scious that we brought only suggestions as to a possible connection/association 
of the concept with social science ‘regulation’ theories. In any case, at present, 
as a consequence of the definitional uncertainty, the analytical comparative as-
sessment (across countries) of existing/ future strategies/policies for achieving 
some form of ‘flexicurity’ arrangements (system) is extremely tricky. 
 
As is clear from the political usage by the Commission, the innovative notion of 
‘flexicurity’ brings undeniable advantages with itself. It is potentially a new 
cognitive framework that could last more that for a political communication ex-
ercise. Quite apart from the furthering of special political interests, ‘flexicurity’ 
studies have been a challenge to doing more social science research and more 
precise comparison. But, on the other hand, from a political sociology point of 
view, it has also important drawbacks for rigorous policy analysis. 
 
More research, we suggest, is necessary to tell whether ‘flexicurity’ will appear 
in a few years as a modish notion, or if it will be possible to define it more 
clearly. The essential stake, to us, lies in the wertfrei comparison of systems 
across Europe and the United States. The assumptions we have made here tend 
to let us think that ‘flexicurity’ could be seen as a specific complementarity of 
institutional domains, which would only be present in certain types of contem-
porary capitalism; these complementarities can also be analysed in terms of po-
litical exchange and compromises between social actors through the debate over 
new formulations of policies (some leading to substantive trade-offs, some to 
conflicts of power, some even to blocked situations where no compromise is 
possible). In this sense, despite its uneasy connection with politics and its prolif-
erating fuzzy usage, ‘flexicurity’ could be seen as a useful identifier of certain 
characteristics of certain labour market and social protection systems within cer-
tain political conditions. Otherwise, the concept will probably fade away rap-
idly, once its innovative political content is exhausted. 
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